Source A

US President Harry Truman recalls his decision to send troops to Korea.

Communism was acting in Korea just as Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese had acted fifteen, twenty years earlier. I felt certain that if South Korea was allowed to fall Communist leaders would be emboldened to override nations close to our own shores. If the Communists were permitted to force their way in to the Republic of Korea without opposition from the free world, no small nation would have the courage to resist threats and aggression by stronger Communist neighbours. If this was allowed to go unchallenged it would mean a third world war.

Harry Truman from his memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope, 1965

Source B

US Secretary of State Dean Acheson gives an explanation for the North Korean Offensive of 25 June 1950.

It seemed close to certain that the North Korean attack had been mounted, supplied and instigated by the Soviet Union and that it would not be stopped by anything short of force. If Korean force proved unequal to the job, as seemed probable, only American intervention could do it. Troops from other sources would be helpful politically and psychologically but unimportant militarily. Plainly, this attack did not amount to a reason to go to war against the Soviet Union. Equally plainly, it was an open undisguised challenge to our internationally accepted position as the protector of South Korea, an area of great importance to the security of American occupied Japan. To back away from this challenge, in view of our capacity for meeting it, would be highly destructive of the power and prestige of the United States.

Dean Acheson from his memoirs: Present at the Creation, 1969

Source C

A statement of protest by the North Korean Foreign Minister, Pak Hon Yong, about US involvement in the Korean conflict.

The United States government supplied the traitorous bandits of Syngman Rhee with political, economic and military aid, and directed in the building and training of Syngman Rhee’s army and in working out the aggressive plan for the invasion of North Korea. Such encouragement and aid spurted the Syngman Rhee clique to start a civil war in Korea. The government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had long since known of the aggressive anti-people’s plan of Syngman Rhee and strove to avoid a civil war, taking all the measures it could to achieve a peaceful unification of our fatherland.

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1950

Source D

A message from Stalin, the Soviet leader, to Kim Il Sung offering support for a North Korean offensive.

Comrade Kim Il Sung must understand that such a large matter in regard to South Korea such as he wants to undertake needs large preparation. The matter must be organized so that there would not be too great a risk. If he wants to discuss this matter with me then I will always be ready to receive him.

Message received by the Soviet ambassador in Pyonyang, Korea, 30 January 1950

Source E

A modern historian reflects on the origins of the Korean War.

The source of the conflict would have been clearer had the Westerners looked at events before June 1950. The policy makers were familiar with the facts but they had little to gain by drawing attention to the recent past, as this might have led to criticisms of their policies. Hence the media and the public in the United States remained uncertain about the long-term origins of the war. They tended to date the beginning of the crisis from the invasion, with the result that it clearly appeared to be a simple act of aggression by one country against another. While this was helpful in generating support for the American war effort, the facts were much more complicated.

T.E. Vadney, The World Since 1945, 1998